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This historical survey examines the relationship between proprietorship, state 
structure, and cultures of power, over the broad expanse of South Asian History. In doing 
so the focus is kept upon the major Indian empires (Maurya, Delhi  Sultanate, Mughal, 
British). The paper maintains that in continental bureaucratic empires that manifest 
arbitrary cultures of power the rulers perceive the state and the country as a personal 
estate. Consequently, the level of insecurity even within the elite, which can be 
dispossessed by the ruler, is remarkably high. Pervasive insecurity means that the 
incentives to work, save, and invest, are greatly diminished, and the creativity and 
enterprise that sustain qualitative improvement in the economic and technological base 
are by and large lacking. This pattern manifests itself more or less consistently until the 
British period when, for a number of reasons, private property, the rule of law, and other 
reforms are introduced. A new dynamic gains momentum an the basis for a modern 
economy are laid.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Proprietorship is an essential fact that the social sciences and humanities must 
deal with. It is tempting to see the development of proprietorship as a struggle 
between the two distinctly European and modern institutional practices of private 
enterprise and communism leading to a grand synthesis in the form of the 
contemporary mixed political economies of welfare prevalent in the industrial 
democracies. While this generalisation may hold substance in the context of the 
West, the historical experience of the rest expressed itself differently. For much of 
history and for the vast majority of the human race proprietorship and the relations to 
which it gave rise flowed from the interaction or lack thereof with the continental 
bureaucratic empire.1   
Ilhan Niaz <niazone@yahoo.com> is a Lecturer and PhD candidate at the Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Department of History, Islamabad. 
1For a broader and more thorough investigation of continental bureaucratic empires, the ideocratic and 
arbitrary cultures of power they spawned, and the impact they had on South Asian history see Ilhan Niaz, An 
Inquiry into the Culture of Power of the Subcontinent (Islamabad: Alhamra, 2006). 
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Initially, continental bureaucratic empires developed in the river valleys of Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, the Indus, and China. The core organising principle of these empires and 
state formations was the universal proprietorship of the ruler. All landed and mercantile 
wealth was ultimately owned by the ruler who alone had an inherent right to property. In 
practice the territorial extent of continental bureaucratic empires combined with the 
physiological limitations of personal rule meant the sovereign had to rely upon 
intermediaries spread across the administrative subunits of his dominions. These 
intermediaries were organised in a hierarchical pattern and were recruited, promoted, 
transferred, and disciplined by the ruler or senior members of his staff. The principal 
economic function of these imperial servants was the collection of rents from the 
cultivator either for the ruler or for themselves as a part of their remuneration. The 
principal political function of the imperial servants was the maintenance of order through 
the explicit or implicit application of force. Society was atomised into insular village 
units incapable of coordinated resistance against the agents of central authority. 
In this sense the entire empire was the personal estate of the ruler in whom alone 
were vested rights of proprietorship. Beneath the ruler were his administrative servants 
including scribes, clerks, priests, soldiers, and military officers. In Ancient Egypt, for 
instance. 
In Egypt scribes were not only amongst the élite, they knew it, and said so plainly. 
“Be a scribe,” ran the advice, “it saves you from toil, it protects you from all manner of 
labour.” “Be a scribe. Your limbs will be sleek, your hands will grow soft. You will go 
forth in white clothes, honoured with courtiers saluting you”. And many a senior figure in 
the state included “scribe” amongst the accumulated titles of his curriculum vitae.2  
These servants were in effect bureaucrats who exercised the ruler’s powers derived 
from his universal proprietorship. They received an inferior right of possession over lands 
and mercantile wealth as part of their remuneration. When they died or were dismissed, 
their mobile and fixed assets were confiscated by the ruler and recycled for 
administrative purposes. Below the administrative classes were cultivators, artisans, and 
merchants, each subjected in turn to the often arbitrary and extortionate demands of the 
ruler’s servants. 
Broadly speaking the system of universal executive proprietorship towards which 
continental bureaucratic empires are historically and structurally prone was driven and 
reinforced by interlocking cycles of insecurity. The ruler felt insecure vis-à-vis the state 
apparatus and other members of the royal family for his universal proprietorship naturally 
made those around him covetous and insecure. This led him to reduce his servants and 
relatives to servility and dependence through a variety of means including preserving a 
significant portion of the military force at the centre, espionage, and reliance on slaves 
and outsiders to fill important positions. Retaining the ultimate proprietorship of the 
wealth of his servants in both land and moveable assets and frequently transferring them 
within the empire to pre-empt the formation of solidarities with the governed were some 
manifestations of the ruler’s fears. 
Such abject dependence on the ruler’s arbitrary will rendered the imperial servants 
highly insecure. The near certainty that they were under continuous surveillance and that 
should they fall from favour their wealth was forfeit, drove them towards excessive  
2Barry J. Kemp, Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilisation (London: Routeledge, 2002), 111. 
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corruption, extortion and arbitrariness towards each other and the people over whom they 
exercised power in the ruler’s name. For the subjects of continental bureaucratic empires 
reactions to the arbitrary treatment meted out by imperial servants ranged from flight to 
fight. Cultivators often fled before tax collectors and the imperial compulsory labour 
requirements. For example, In Ancient Egypt scribes organised conscripted labour, 
rations, and building materials. While the pharaoh’s subjects may have believed him to 
be a god, few relished the prospect of backbreaking labour in the Egyptian sun for 
months on end away from their families. Many tried to flee but failed because, as a 
“typical entry” from a prison register dated to the Middle Kingdom (2052-1786 BC) 
reveals, the families of runaways were thrown in prison and held hostage.3  Subordinate 
landlords, tax farmers, and village headmen, rebelled in response to excessive extortion. 
Most, however, responded with a combination of concealment, evasion, and servility 
when the state was effective and apathy and opportunism when it weakened or failed.  
Arguably, the greatest casualty of the continental bureaucratic mode of 
proprietorship was trust, within the apparatus, between the rulers and ruled, and amongst 
the members of society at large. So long as the personal abilities of the ruler and his 
servants were sufficient to grapple with inchoate but relentless centrifugal tendencies, the 
empire prevailed. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) quotes Anosharwan, the great sixth century 
AD Sassanid Persian emperor, to support his understanding of the ideal towards which 
such empires aspired: 
Royal authority exists through the army, the army through money, money through 
taxes, taxes through cultivation, cultivation through justice, justice through the 
improvement of officials, the improvement of officials through the forthrightness of 
wazirs, and the whole thing in the first place through the ruler’s personal supervision of 
this subjects’ condition and his ability to educate them, so that he may rule them, and not 
they him.4 
For the edification of senior civil servants of the realm Ibn Khaldun cites the 
Epistle of Abd al-Hamid bin Yahya, (d. 750) Secretary to the Umayyad dynasty, as the 
ideal towards which continental bureaucratic empires ought to strive in terms of the 
intellectual and moral qualities of their servants, upon whom depends, in no small 
measure, the quality of governance: 
He (God) gave to you, secretaries, the great opportunity to be men of education 
and gentlemen, to have knowledge and good judgment. You bring whatever is good in 
the caliphate and straighten out its affairs. Through your advice, God improves the 
government for the benefit of human beings and makes their countries civilised. The ruler 
cannot dispense with you. You alone make him a competent ruler. Your position with 
regard to rulers is that you are the ears through which they hear, the eyes through which 
they see, the tongues through which they speak, and the hands through which they touch. 
May God give you, therefore, enjoyment of the excellent craft with which He has 
distinguished you, and may He not deprive you of the great favours that He has shown 
you.  
3Ibid., 129. 
4Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah (An Introduction to History), trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. N. J. Dawood 
(London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 40-41. For Ibn Khaldun, the terms “dynasty” and “state” were 
synonymous for “A state exists only insofar as it is held together by the dynasty; when the dynasty disappears 
the state collapses”. Ibid., xi. 
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No craftsman needs more than you to combine all praiseworthy and good traits 
and all memorable and highly regarded excellent qualities, O secretaries, if you aspire to 
fit the description given of you in this letter. The secretary needs on his own account, and 
his master, who trusts him with important affairs, expects him, to be mild where mildness 
is needed, to be understanding where judgment is needed, to be enterprising where 
enterprise is needed, to be hesitant where hesitation is needed. He must prefer modesty, 
justice and fairness. He must keep secrets. He must be faithful in difficult circumstances. 
He must know (beforehand) about the calamites that may come. He must be able to put 
things in their proper places and misfortunes into their proper categories.  He must have 
studied every branch of learning and must know it well, and if he does not know it well, 
he must at least have acquired an adequate amount of it. By virtue of his natural 
intelligence, good education, and outstanding experience, he must know what is going to 
happen to him before it happens, and he must know the results of his actions before 
action starts. He must make the proper preparations for everything, and he must set up 
everything in its proper customary form.5 
When these abilities deteriorated the empire sank into anarchy and warlordism that 
awaited a Hobbesian solution in the form of a new Leviathan which, in turn, manifested 
the same arbitrary culture of power as its predecessors. In this culture of power the 
country was the personal estate of the ruler. The military and civil officials of the empire 
were personal servants or slaves of the ruler. The ruler was legitimated by an official 
ideology or religion that exalted him above questioning or presented him as divinity 
incarnate. It was thus that the universal proprietorship of the ruler formed the core 
principle of organisation in a continental bureaucratic empire and that the notion that the 
country was the personal estate of the ruler with which he could do as he pleased became 
an essential part of an arbitrary culture of power that reinforced the tendencies towards 
political centralisation, social atomisation and apathy, and ideological delusions.   
ANCIENT INDIA 
Ancient India broadly refers to the period from the rise of the Indus Valley Civilisation 
(c 2250 BC) to the advent of the Turks (c AD 1000). As might be expected this period 
witnessed the rise and fall of many different empires, states, tribes, and religious and cultural 
movements. The great cities of the Indus Valley civilisation, the magnificent palaces and 
monuments of the Mauryas and Guptas, the fortresses of the Rajputs, and the temples and 
monasteries of Hinduism and Buddhism are just some of the major features of the period that 
the non-specialist will be familiar with. The greatest amount of information pertinent to the 
understanding of the exercise of state power during this period concerns the Maurya Empire 
(c 320 BC – 185 BC) and it is upon it that we will concentrate. 
The Mauryas operated a large and complex state formally divided into over three 
dozen ministries and departments. The military and civil servants were paid salaries and 
held their positions by virtue of the emperor’s favour. The emperor was an agent of 
divine will and possessed a varied network of spies and informers that were particularly 
watchful of his family and senior servants. Princes are compared to crabs by Kautilya, the 
compiler of the Arthashastra and prime minister to the first Maurya ruler.  
5Ibid., 203-204.  
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The emperor was the universal proprietor. In his domains “all land” belonged to 
him and “no private person” was “allowed to own land”.6 In the countryside, which was 
divided into subunits ranging from the single village to provinces (800 villages), the 
cultivators paid rent to the emperor. The rent averaged 25 percent and was collected by a 
hierarchy of executive officers beginning from the village headman (paid 500 panas or 
silver currency units per year) graduating to the gopa (5–10 villages) and circle officer 
(sthanika) and culminating in the controller general. The farmers were granted possession 
of land for their lifetime or so long as they could meet the revenue demands of the state.7 
The village administration and executive officers received land grants as well as generous 
cash salaries, while the bureaucratic undergrowth of petty clerks, policemen, labour 
contractors and menials, made do with small salaries. It was the emperor’s prerogative to 
construct large water reservoirs, allocate pasture land, fisheries, and forests, subsidise and 
administer local infrastructure, and maintain communications (highways, roads, inns).8 
Like the agrarian sector, the mercantile and manufacturing sectors of the economy 
were subject to royal ownership, domination, and regulation. The emperor maintained 
royal workshops for the production of luxury goods and armaments. Mining, salt, and 
elephant forests, were royal monopolies. A “Chief Protector of Animals” was entrusted 
with the task of seeking out and bringing to royal attention such fauna as may arouse 
interest.9 A hierarchy of trade and communications officials ranging from chief 
controllers of state trading and private trading, to timekeepers and inspectors, supervised 
and directed mercantile activity. The emperor and his servants prescribed limits to profits, 
inventories and movement, which, if violated, led to the auction and/or confiscation of 
the merchant’s stock.10 In terms of movement, merchants could bring their goods through 
customs posts where teams of four or five customs collectors made detailed records.11 
Moreover, spies and “clandestine agents” infiltrated mercantile establishments and 
sometimes posed as merchants.12 The idea was to test the fidelity of customs officials and 
prevent merchants from trusting each other. Even bars and brothels were run by the state 
apparatus with madams receiving salaries of 1000 panas per year and freelance 
prostitutes having to pay 18 percent of their gross income as tax.13 The state even 
attempted to regulate the rates of interest charged by private companies and merchants on 
loans for a wide range of transactions. Normal domestic trade was charged at 15 percent 
interest, commercial loans were fixed at 60 percent interest, overland travel through high-
risk areas such as forests and borderlands, was fixed at 120 percent, while loans taken for 
shipping goods overseas charged 240 percent interest.14 
The picture that emerges of proprietorship in Ancient India from the documentary 
record is that the ruler dominated it. The entire country was the personal estate of the 
ruler and he could at will confiscate, transfer, or occupy, property. This pattern differed  
6Hermann Kulke, and Dietmar Rothermund, A History of India (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 
1991), 62.  
7Kautilya, The Arthashastra, trans. L. N. Rangaraja (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992), 179. 
8Ibid., 181-3. 
9Ibid., 320. 
10Ibid., 336-338. 
11Ibid., 340. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid., 351-353. 
14Ibid., 426.  
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substantially from the norms prevalent in the classical West where proprietorship was 
vested either in citizens (Athens, Rome) or in the state as an institution (Sparta). 
Universal royal proprietorship led to a great deal of arbitrariness and insecurity within the 
ruling élite as well as between the rulers and the ruled. Society, atomised by absolutist 
rule, was principally apathetic to the fate of the apparatus. A change of dynasty or the 
breakup of the empire simply changed the ruler to whom rent was due. Resistance was 
localised and effectively dealt with by the central state so long as it was competently led. 
Even in the smallest pre-Turkic Indian states, such as the Rajput principalities, the ruler 
was the universal landlord who granted lands and took them away from his servants as he 
pleased. This was the condition of proprietorship that the Turkish invaders found in much 
of India when large parts of it came under their rule (AD 1000 – 1400).   
PROPRIETORSHIP IN MEDIEVAL INDIA 1206-1707 
The Sultans of Delhi (1206-1526) divided their sprawling estate into lands 
administered and taxed directly by the crown (khalsa) and lands farmed out to their 
servants and slaves as payment for service (iqta). In the peripheral and geographically 
challenging areas local leaders were, in theory, supposed to pay rent in the form of tribute 
to their overlord, though practical difficulties often made this an unappetising proposition 
for the sultanate. The sultan was by far “the biggest landholder” and “in fact the only one 
whose property had an undisputed legal basis.”15 As the universal landlord, the sultan had 
his pick of the land and could “employ the resources of the state to enhance their 
productive capacity.”16 The tax rate on land varied from one-third to one-half and rulers 
routinely engaged in mass confiscations of revenue assignments, grants, and private 
property.17 During the late-thirteenth century, for example, Alauddin Khalji’s arbitrary 
confiscations and measures fell so heavily upon more prosperous cultivators and tax 
farmers that “…no trace of gold or silver or money remained in their houses and their 
wives were compelled to work as maid servants for wages.”18 
While land yielded the bulk of the sultanate’s wealth, the market was also an important 
source of revenue. To dominate commerce and manufacturing the sultanate was equipped 
with a ministry of markets. This ministry granted licenses and government contracts, collected 
customs duties, enforced price controls, kept track of entertainment establishments, and 
regulated weights and measures. A central depository was maintained at the capital to control 
the distribution and taxation of certain goods, and traders who did not submit to its discipline 
were punished by having their joints “opened” by a blade.19 Retailers and traders were 
dependent on the apparatus for their personal safety and prosperity, whose inspectors and 
supervisors were authorised to deal with them “through the whip of justice.”20  
15K. M. Ashraf, Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 
1959), 64. 
16Ibid. 
17Peter Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 242-4. 
18Tapan Raychaudhry and Irfan Habib, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol.1, c1200 to 
c1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 55. 
19K. A. Nizami, ed., Politics and Society During the Early Medieval Period: Collected Works of 
Professor Mohammed Habib, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1981), 158.  
20Ibid., 155-6. 
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The sultan owned factories and workshops that employed thousands of slaves and 
labourers. Alauddin Khalji owned fifty thousand slaves while Firuz Tughluq, in the mid-
fourteenth century, owned two hundred thousand slaves of which twelve thousand were 
craftsmen.21 Leading nobles maintained similar establishments albeit on a smaller scale. 
The bulk of the production was absorbed by conspicuous consumption and the military, 
while the leftovers were sold in the market for profit or pilfered.  
Under the larger and more stable Mughal Empire (1526-1707) the same principles 
of universal proprietorship prevailed with similar consequences. The emperor directly 
managed the crown lands and distributed the rest as revenue assignments (jagirs) to his 
officials and constituted “…himself the heir of all the Omrahs, or lords, and likewise of 
the Mansabdars or inferior lords”.22 Furthermore, “…what is of the utmost importance” 
is “that he is proprietor of every acre of land in the kingdom, excepting, perhaps, some 
houses and gardens which he sometimes permits his subjects to buy, sell, and otherwise 
dispose of, among themselves”.23 
The rent charged by the emperor varied from one-third to three-fifths and villages 
“could be so heavily assessed that the peasant population was threatened with slaughter and 
enslavement” should taxes go unpaid.24 Flight from the land in the mid-seventeenth 
century, when the empire was at its zenith, “was a common phenomenon”.25 The revenue 
system was driven by “the uncomplicated desire” of the administrative élite for “more and 
more material resources” and extracted one-third to one-half of GNP as revenue.26 The 
insecurity of the emperor’s officials led them to squeeze “as much as they could” from the 
tenants and ignore “the economic future of the areas temporarily” in their charge.27  
Trade and manufacturing fared little better. Bribes were absolutely necessary to 
get the complex official machinery, which, at major ports, included superintendents for 
everything from horses to charitable endowments, to do its job. Merchants needed 
passports to travel within the country, depended on official patronage, were wary of spies 
infiltrated into their caravans, and were acutely aware of the threat of expropriation that 
hung over their heads. Often, merchants became the middle-men and servants of officials 
who served monopolies. Indeed,  
There can be little encouragement to engage in commercial pursuits, when 
the success with which they may be attended, instead of adding to the 
enjoyments of life, provokes the cupidity of a neighbouring tyrant 
possessing both the power and inclination to deprive any man of the fruits of 
his industry. When wealth is acquired, as must sometimes be the case, the 
possessor, so far from living with increased comfort and assuming an air of 
independence, studies the means by which he may appear indigent.28  
21Ashraf, Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan, 59. 
22François Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire: AD 1656-1668, trans. Irving Brock, revised and 
improved edition, Archibald Constable (London: Archibald Constable and Company, 1891; reprint, Karachi: 
Indus Publications, n.d.), 204. 
23Ibid. 
24Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perspective (New Delhi: Tulika, 1995), 192.  
25Ibid., 195. 
26Raychaudhry, The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 1, c1200 to c1750, 172-3. 
27Ibid., 173.  
28Bernier, Travels in the Mogol Empire, 225. 
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Artisans, employed for luxury goods and armaments production by the emperor 
and his servants had “reason to congratulate” themselves if they escaped whipping “given 
in part payment”.29 
The nature of proprietorship under the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire 
was precarious even at the best of times. The sovereign ruled the country like a personal 
estate and enforced his universal proprietorship through a predatory administrative élite. 
The elite was itself ever uncertain of its position relative to the emperor it served and 
behaved in the most arbitrary and self-aggrandising manner possible. This in turn 
reinforced the atomisation, apathy, and turbulence of Indian society, and ensured that 
soon after the accidental succession of competent rulers failed, the empire fragmented 
into hundreds of petty bureaucratic estates. By the early-eighteenth century, however, 
European trading companies were making their presence felt in parts of the subcontinent. 
The most famous and successful of these was the English East India Company, and it is 
to England that we must now turn to examine a profoundly differently form of the state 
and proprietary structure.   
ENGLAND 
The oldest surviving document of Anglo-Saxon law (c AD 600) deals with private 
property rights.30 The primordial structure of English government was characterised by a 
powerful landowning aristocracy that either lacked a central executive or submitted only 
reluctantly to higher political authority. The aristocracy dominated the witena gemot (the 
council of the wise) which, together with semiannual gatherings of free farmers and 
townsmen, voted taxes and approved laws. 
In 1066, William, Duke of Normandy, invaded England and appended it to his 
realm. A more structured and authoritarian monarchy was established and nobility from 
Normandy was settled in the country. Consequently, the Norman monarchs regarded their 
nobility as tenants of the crown who held their estates not by any inherent right, but in 
exchange for military and political service. Having said that, the estates were hereditary 
and with the monarch’s attention perpetually distracted by continental entanglements, the 
Norman nobility struck local roots, developed a powerful proprietary interest in their 
estates, became culturally anglicised, and adopted the Anglo-Saxon local government 
institutions. These developments had important consequences in two vital respects. 
One was that from 1066 to 1230 the Norman (or Anglo-Norman) aristocracy, both 
lay and clerical, founded one hundred and twenty-five new towns and settlements.31 
Anyone with money was invited to buy land in the new settlement and/or set up shop in 
the market area. Purchase brought with it proprietary as well as personal rights and 
merely living in the town for over a year could confer freeman status on serfs. The lord 
collected taxes and fees from the city while the town, as it grew, conferred greater wealth, 
power, and prestige upon its founder. Given the low life-expectancy at the time and the 
slow rate of economic growth, developing a town was a long-term project unlikely to  
29M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurungzeb (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1970), 
157.  
30Robert Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 125. 
31Danny Danzinger and John Gillingham, 1215: The Year of Magna Carta (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 2003), 52-3.  
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yield much profit within a single generation. If the Anglo-Norman aristocrat had felt that 
his property was subject to arbitrary confiscation upon his death or transfer every few 
years, the investment would not have, in all probability, been made.  
The other striking manifestations of proprietary roots was that the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy became increasingly suspicious of new arrivals from their ancestral home and 
began to resent performing military and political service at the monarch’s behest in 
Normandy. These tendencies culminated in a showdown after, in 1204, the French 
occupied Normandy. King John (1199–1216) wanted to regain control of the Norman 
homeland. Generating resources for the re-conquest meant that the king pushed his legal 
prerogatives to the limits, raised taxes, hired mercenaries, and brought many of his 
foreign favourites to England. In 1215, these changes triggered a rebellion that led to the 
signing of the Great Charter or Magna Charta. Over a dozen of Magna Charta’s sixty-
three articles place limits upon the king’s proprietary and fiscal rights especially as 
regards inheritance, tax collections, the rights and liberties of towns, and punitive 
confiscation for default on debts. 
Reissued nearly forty times between 1215 and 1688, Magna Charta established 
the principle that the executive was not the universal proprietor with unlimited rights over 
the aristocracy and freemen. The civil wars and constitutional crises that periodically 
gripped England steadily shifted the balance of institutional power in favour of the 
parliament and judiciary. A curious development during this period was the 
commercialisation of agriculture as aristocrats and gentry enclosed their estates, evicted 
tenants, and took to sheep rearing and marketing wool for profit. Thus in England, the 
landlord evolved from a collector of feudal dues and rents, to a capitalist farmer with 
strong links to the market. English society’s “positive attitude” towards commerce and 
manufacturing, was reflected in the “social hierarchy, as the great houses and estates of 
the merchant princes around London” while “many of the greatest families owed their 
fortunes to trade and did not disdain to return to it or to marry merchants’ daughters”.32 
It was perhaps fitting then that the British Empire in India was founded the 
English East India Company, which “joined the ranks of the powerful predators at large 
in mid-eighteenth century India”.33 Simultaneously seduced by prospects of unimaginable 
riches and compelled by the turbulence of the period, “a small band of what might be 
called private-enterprise imperialists” took the initiative into their own hands and 
between 1750 and 1770 defeated their French rivals, conquered Bengal, and reduced the 
Mughal Emperor to the status of a protected stooge.34 These company men aroused 
admiration and horror at home at the return of wealthy “nabob” from India who used 
their often ill-gotten wealth to buy parliamentary seats.35 As evidence of Company 
misrule and corruption mounted demands for Parliamentary regulation grew increasingly 
vociferous. The results included a series of regulating acts, beginning in 1773, that 
brought the Company and its dominions under parliamentary control. The British Empire 
in India was thus born.   
32T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660-1789 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 303.  
33Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London: Abacus, 2003), 28.  
34Ibid., 43. 
35Ibid., 48. There were 26 such Parliamentary “nabobs” in 1774-80, and 45 in 1790, out of a total of 
558 MPs in the House of Commons.  
Ilhan Niaz  336
THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 
The “private-enterprise imperialists” who founded the British Empire in India 
were not particularly interested in reforming the principles of statecraft in their newly 
acquired dominion. If anything, the universal proprietorship of the sovereign and the 
irresponsibility of his servants that had traditionally characterised India’s culture of 
power were admirably suited to the plunder and extraction of public resources for private 
gain. The last of the Company appointed governor generals, Warren Hastings (1773–
1785), was mainly concerned about making the writ of the state more effective while 
retaining the overarching principle of ruler proprietorship. When in India, he felt, it was 
best to do as the Indians do, albeit more efficiently. 
Change at the level of principle began with the arrival of Lord Cornwallis (1785–
1793), the first aristocrat and parliamentary representative to be appointed governor 
general. Cornwallis, like many of his colleagues and subordinates, was convinced that the 
“oriental principles of government”36 were inherently flaw and ultimately to blame for 
the poor quality of governance that prevailed. If a substantive change for the better was to 
be brought about, the reforms would have to address the principles of statecraft and not 
focus on merely making the mechanism more effective, though, that too was necessary. 
Cornwallis’s reforms dealt with many aspects of governance, such as the civil service, 
police, taxation, and the judiciary. A conscious effort was made to reconstitute these 
organs as autonomous institutions under law. Along with these reforms, Cornwallis 
renounced the universal proprietorship of the ruler and assigned proprietary rights in land 
to the zamindars (tax farmers, not really “masters of the land”) in exchange for a fixed 
assessment. Initially, the settlement was made for ten years but in 1793 it was 
reconstituted in perpetuity as the Permanent Settlement. 
The Permanent Settlement was a classical example of Enlightenment and post-
Enlightenment universalism and proceeded from a certain logic that made, and makes, 
eminent sense. Human nature is selfish, materialistic, and acquisitive. Under a despotic 
government the level of material insecurity increases. Wealthier people are thus driven 
towards unrestrained and remorseless self-aggrandisement coupled with flight and 
concealment. Those less economically fortunate, become apathetic and fatalistic in their 
outlook. The perception that wealth flows from the abuse of power, proximity to the 
ruler, and government favour, becomes entrenched in the minds of rich and poor alike. 
Consequently, at a collective level, the public and private interest in damaged as the 
incentive to save, invest, and work hard, is greatly diminished. By giving the landlord a 
permanent stake in the land under his control, moving the fear of arbitrary confiscation 
and transfer, and disbanding the private police forces, it was hoped that a virtuous 
upwards spiral of self-improvement, security, and prosperity, would be unleashed. 
Cornwallis “…hoped the zamindars would be transformed into paternalistic English 
squires who improved their land, looked after their tenants, built some roads and carried 
out the duties of local administration”.37 Of course, no such thing happened. The 
landlords “performed none of the duties expected of them”,38 continued to live as before,  
36Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959; reprint, 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 4. 
37David Gilmour, The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj (London: John Murray, 2005), 110. 
38Ibid. 
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took loans to pay their taxes and indulge their fancies, and ended up losing lands by 
defaulting on tax payments or loan payments. In the place of parasitic landlordism, an 
equally pernicious absentee landlordism by Bengali merchants emerged.  
As the British Empire in India expanded and the deficiencies in the working of the 
Permanent Settlement became apparent, debate emerged on the structure of 
proprietorship. Senior civil servants like Thomas Munro, with experience in the Bombay 
and Madras presidencies, found that the earliest revenue settlements had been made 
between the state and individual cultivators or village communities. Munro and his 
supporters argued that vesting property rights in the ordinary cultivator (ryot) or village 
communities, would better serve the public interest.39 The peasant and the village had a 
greater material interest in improvement and were already accustomed to hard work.  
After efforts to apply the Bengal system to Madras ran into serious trouble, 
experiments began with ryotwari and village settlements and by the 1820s these became 
the norm in the Bombay and Madras presidencies. In other parts of India, such as the 
Punjab, small and medium landlords proliferated in certain areas while big jargirdars 
dominated others. Indeed, the “British were proud of the Punjab School, of its 
combination of respect for local culture and intolerance of practices singled out in John 
Lawrence’s famous trilogue: ‘Do not burn widows/Do not kill daughters/Do not bury 
lepers alive’.”40 In the Punjab laws were passed to protect landlords and farmers from 
moneylenders, “vast irrigation projects” were undertaken, and the province became a 
centre of military recruitment providing the Raj with half of its Indian troops by 1875.41 
Revenue settlements were made for a number of lengths varying from 10 to 40 years. The 
principle of compensatory confiscation in the event of emergency or public need was 
developed and regulated by law. Alongside privately owned land and capital, institutional 
public property, such as railways, canals, posts and telegraph services, health and 
education (under local governments), was also introduced.  
Under a low-taxing and remarkably predictable British rule taxes varied from 5-9 
percent of GNP as against the 18-50 percent of GNP extracted by pre-British states.42 
During the imperial period several important shifts occurred in the broad structure of 
proprietorship and political economy. By 1933, land revenue accounted for 23 percent of 
the total, against customs’ 32 percent and income tax’s 11 percent.43 By 1946-7 the same 
heads yielded 7 percent, 22 percent, and 37 percent, respectively.44 Institutionalised 
savings rose from Rs 125 million (eight banks) in 1870, to Rs 1 billion (56 banks) in 
1913, to Rs 12 billion (700 banks) in 1946-7.45 While the subcontinent remained 
substantially agrarian, the Raj had laid the foundations of a modern economy 
characterised by the dominance of private property in most sectors and institutional 
property in others (such as mass transit).   
39Dodwell, H. H., ed. The Cambridge History of India, vol. 5, British India 1497–1858 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1921; reprint, New Delhi: S. Chand & Company (Pvt.) Ltd., 1987), 470. 
40Gilmour, The Ruling Caste, 163. 
41Ibid. 
42Dharma Kumar, The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. II, c. 1757 – c. 1970 (Cambridge: 
The Press Syndicate of the Cambridge University, 1982; reprint, Delhi: Orient Longman, 1984), 927. 
43Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform Session 1933-34, vol. I, part I (London: His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1934), 160. 
44Dharma Kumar, The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. II, c. 1757 – c. 1970, 929. 
45Ibid., 775. 
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The many failings of the Raj notwithstanding, it had introduced and applied with 
remarkable success the principle that the country was not the personal estate of the ruler. 
This principle was rigorously applied to their official presence in India at the apex of 
which was the Indian Civil Service (ICS): 
At his retirement dinner in 1898 Sir John Edge remarked that during his years as 
Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court he had received over a thousand letters, 
usually anonymous, abusing the ICS. Yet not one of them had suggested ‘even covertly 
that any member of the Covenanted Civil Service has acted from any corrupt motive in 
any matter.’ With this omission, the authors of the anonymous letters had thus paid a 
great if unintended compliment.46 
The British took great care to ensure that their officers in India did not abuse their 
public powers to secure private gain and disallowed them “any interest, however, innocent, 
in any commercial venture that might affect their professional conduct.”47 Thus, “If you 
were the Chief Secretary in Madras, your son could not own a coffee plantation in the 
presidency; if you were Political Agent in a native state, your relations could not buy 
property there.”48 Officers “had to be above suspicion” and “incorruptible”.49 Even the 
appearance of impropriety, such as in the cases of James Gribble (Madras, ICS) who 
unwisely invested in a local company and sold his shares or John Beames (Bengal, ICS) 
who borrowed money from Indians in his jurisdiction, resulted in “censure”, “suspension”, 
“demotion”, “early retirement”, and disgrace.50 The point driven home so resolutely was 
that the state was not the personal estate of the ruler and that the use of public power for 
private ends was unacceptable. From that singular reform other reforms, such as 
autonomous bureaucratic institutions, legislatures, and the judiciary, drew strength.  
CONCLUSION 
In this historical survey of proprietorship the most evident lesson is that for most 
of the subcontinent’s history the ruler was the ultimate proprietor of landed and 
mercantile wealth in his realm. His servants received a share of that wealth while they 
remained in his favour. If they lost favour the ruler confiscated their wealth and kept it 
for himself or gave it to another servant. During some periods many of the servants were 
themselves the property or slaves of the ruler, such during the Delhi Sultanate. While this 
mode of proprietorship enabled centralisation regardless of the territorial extend of the 
state, it produced great uncertainty, rapaciousness, arbitrariness, and apathy.   
In the British context an antithetical form of proprietorship emerged. Its two 
outstanding principles were that landed property and mercantile wealth were either 
owned by private individuals and secure under law, or it was owned by institutions (Bank 
of England, the East India Company, Turnpike Trusts, the Anglican Church, the City of 
London, etc.) under law. While many deficiencies and questionable practices continued 
well into the nineteenth century, proprietorship under these conditions produced 
sustained growth and harnessed to a significant degree private greed to the public good.   
46Gilmour, The Ruling Caste, 148.  
47Ibid., 149. 
48Ibid. 
49Ibid. 
50Ibid. 
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The introduction of private and institutional property into India by the British had 
mixed results. Its structure in terms of landed property also varied from territory to 
territory, and, sometimes, within territories as well. Broadly speaking, these reforms and 
long years of application, brought British India to a point where the principles and 
practice of institutional and private proprietorship prevailed to an extent comparable to 
many continental European countries.  
Regrettably, after independence, South Asian ruling élites have steadily reverted to 
the pre-British practice of treating the country as a vast personal estate. This has 
manifested itself in two ways. On the one hand rulers through arbitrary acts undermine 
the security of private ownership.51 On the other hand, institutional property is used and 
abused as if it is the private property of the rulers.52 These tendencies are inherent in the 
nature of continental bureaucratic empires and the arbitrary cultures of power that 
historically characterise their behaviour. The consequences of this reversion, successes in 
some sectors notwithstanding, include rampant corruption in the public and private 
sectors, capital flight, a heavy emphasis on speculation, and the steady erosion of public 
order and private security.53     
51In 2003, Bihar’s rulers, Laloo Prasad Yadav and Rabri Devi, celebrated the wedding of their 
daughter. In order to provide transport for the wedding, Prasad’s henchmen seized forty-five luxury cars from 
showrooms in the provincial capital. One hundred sofa sets and other items were seized from shops and seven 
hundred thousand rupees worth of fabric were confiscated from Raymond’s outlets alone. For refreshments, 
bakers and vendors were forced to handover their stocks. Before the Tatas, one of India’s leading business and 
industrial families, lodged a complaint with the police, they locked down their showrooms and evacuated their 
staff to Calcutta for fear of arbitrary punishment. 
52In Pakistan, the military and bureaucratic land-mafia has converted vast amounts of public land into 
housing schemes in which members of the apparatus received preferential rates, often at throwaway prices. 
This, of course, fuels land speculation. 
53For further reading on this subject, see, Azhar Hassan Nadeem, Pakistan: The Political Economy of 
Lawlessness (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
